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PROXIMATE VS. GEOGRAPHIC LIMITS  





 The exclusive rights of a U.S. patent are limited in two important ways. First, a patent has a 
technical scope—only the products and methods set out in the patent’s claims may constitute 
infringement.1 Second, a patent has a geographic scope—making, using, or selling the products or 
methods described in the patent’s claims will only constitute infringement if that activity takes 
place in the United States.2 These boundaries are foundational features of the patent system: there 
can be no liability for U.S. patent infringement without an act that falls within both the technical 
and geographic scope of the patent. 
 Once liability has been established and a court’s attention turns to remedies, the continued 
relevance of these boundaries is not so clear. If all the infringing activity and all the resulting harm 
are within the technical and geographic scope of the patent, there is no problem. But, sometimes, 
activities within the technical and geographic scope of a patent cause harm to the patentee 
somewhere outside that scope. For example, a defendant’s infringing sales of a patented product 
may cause the patent holder to lose some sales of an unpatented product too. Or, as another 
example, a defendant’s infringing activity in the United States might cause a patent holder to lose 
sales somewhere else. Are these harms—to sales of a different product, or in a different country—
cognizable for purposes of measuring the patent holder’s damages? Or do the basic limits on patent 
scope apply to questions of remedy just as they do to questions of liability?3 
 The Federal Circuit has resolved this puzzle differently depending on which boundary is at 
issue. When it comes to technical scope, the Federal Circuit has long held that patent holders may 
recover for all the harms actually and proximately caused by the infringement.4 As a result, if the 
defendant’s infringing actions divert sales from the patent holder, the patent holder can potentially 
                                                 
*Associate Professor, Notre Dame Law School. Portions of this Essay originally appeared in an amicus brief I 
filed on my own behalf in WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp. For very helpful comments on that brief 
and/or earlier drafts of this Essay, I thank Samuel Bray, Alexandra Levy, and Jeffrey Pojanowski. I also thank 
Michael Benson for his excellent research assistance. 
1 See Festo Corp. v. Shokestu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002). 
2 See Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 441 (2007). Applying this geographic limit on the scope 
of patent liability can be much more complicated than it might first seem. See NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 
418 F. 3d 1282, 1314-24 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
3 Patent rights are limited in another important way as well: by time. See Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 
135 S. Ct. 2401, 2406–07 (2015). This third limitation on patent scope raises analogous questions about when a 
patent holder may recover for harms that arise after patent expiration as a result of a defendant’s actions before 
expiration. It appears the Federal Circuit has not yet squarely addressed the question. For a district court opinion 
permitting a patent holder to present evidence of future lost profits on the theory that in-term infringement would 
allow the defendant to enter the market more quickly upon expiration, see BIC Leisure Prods, Inc. v. Windsurfing 
Int’l, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 134, 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
4 See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). 
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recover all of those lost sales, whether or not they fall inside or outside the technical scope of the 
patent at issue.5  
 When it comes to harms beyond a patent’s geographic scope, however, the Federal Circuit 
has taken a different approach. In a series of recent cases, the court has developed a hard-and-fast 
geographic limit, categorically denying recovery of any foreign losses that were caused by the 
domestic infringement.6 As a result, if infringing activity inside the United States causes lost sales 
outside the United States, those losses are simply left to lie where they fall—even if they were 
actually and proximately caused by the infringing act.  
 Under the Federal Circuit’s current approach, then, the technical scope of a patent is applied 
only once in a patent case—to determine whether the defendant can be held liable as an infringer. 
In contrast, the geographic scope of a patent does a kind of double duty, applying first to the 
question of liability, and a second time to the question of damages. 
 This Essay argues that the same approach adopted at the edge of technical scope should apply 
at the geographic boundary as well. Specifically, patent holders should recover for the injuries 
actually and proximately caused by domestic acts of infringement, even if those injuries arise 
outside the technical or geographic scope of the patent. The Federal Circuit has correctly decided 
cases in which damages fall across the line of technical scope, but erred when it comes to damages 
that happen to cross a geographic boundary.7  
 
I. THE ROLE OF THE RIGHTFUL POSITION IN ASSESSING PATENT DAMAGES 
 
The Patent Act’s damages provision is straightforward: “Upon finding for the claimant the 
court shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no 
event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together 
with interest and costs as fixed by the court.”8 The statute goes on to permit trebling of damages; 
other provisions authorize awards of attorneys’ fees9 and issuance of injunctions.10 
Congress did not draw the words “damages adequate to compensate for the infringement” from 
the ether. Those words have a long provenance at common law, and, in choosing those words, 
Congress indicated that a particular remedial model was mandatory in cases in which patent 
infringement had been proven. Prevailing patent holders no longer had the option of receiving an 
accounting for profits, as they had prior to 1946.11 Nor were patent holders entitled to statutory 
damages, as copyright holders then enjoyed under the Copyright Act of 1909.12 Rather, from the 
                                                 
5 Id. at 1547. 
6 See WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 791 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 
734 (Jan. 12, 2018) (No. 16-1011); Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., 807 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 
2015); Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 711 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
7 For prior commentary on the cross-border damages question, see generally Timothy R. Holbrook, Boundaries, 
Extraterritoriality, and Patent Infringement Damages, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1745 (2017) (arguing that geographic 
limits on damages should depend on the plaintiff’s theory of infringement and the nature of the damages sought); 
Sapna Kumar, Patent Damages without Borders, 25 Texas Intell. Prop. L.J. 73 (2018) (arguing for a geographic 
limit on patent damages guided by a flexible balancing test). 
8 35 U.S.C.A. § 284 (2012 & Supp. 2017). 
9 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1952). 
10 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1952). 
11 See R.S. § 4921, as amended, 42 Stat. 392; Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 
505–06 (1964) (plurality opinion) (explaining 1946 amendments). 
12 See Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 25(b), 35 Stat. 1075, 1081 (1909); Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 
523 U.S. 340, 349–54 (1998) (recounting the history of statutory damages in copyright). 
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menu of familiar remedial schemes, Congress selected compensatory (or “actual”) damages in 
particular, and in so doing made an informed choice to bring along the accompanying doctrines 
that applied at common law.  
By using the words “damages adequate to compensate for the infringement,” Congress did two 
things. First, it provided a principle of measurement to guide fact-finders in their assessment of 
patent damages. Specifically, a prevailing patentee should be restored to her “rightful position”—
that is, the pecuniary position she would have enjoyed absent the infringement. Second, Congress 
incorporated a well-developed body of law informing how that principle of measurement should 
be implemented. These doctrines—comprising causation requirements, evidentiary burdens, and 
prudential rules—channel, and in some instances limit, the availability of compensatory damages 
in patent cases. 
The central tenet of compensatory damages is that the plaintiff should be restored to the 
position she enjoyed prior to the wrong. As Lord Blackburn famously explained, these damages 
are “that sum of money which will put the party who has been injured, or who has suffered, in the 
same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained the wrong for which he is now 
getting his compensation.”13 In a patent case, the measure of compensatory damages is thus “the 
difference between [the patentee’s] pecuniary condition after the infringement, and what his 
condition would have been if the infringement had not occurred.”14 The proposition that actual 
damages should return the plaintiff to the pecuniary position she would have been in but-for the 
wrong is unimpeachable; in fact, it is no exaggeration to say it is the founding principle of the 
compensatory damages remedy. As the Supreme Court recognized as early as 1867, “The general 
rule is, that when a wrong has been done, and the law gives a remedy, the compensation shall be 
equal to the injury . . . The injured party is to be placed, as near as may be, in the situation he would 
have occupied if the wrong had not been committed.”15  
One way infringement may leave a patentee in an inferior pecuniary condition is through the 
loss of profits. When the patent holder must compete with an infringer, she may suffer in terms of 
lower price, lost volume, or both, and as a result may collect a smaller amount of profits than she 
would have had the infringer respected her patent rights.16 The rule for this calculation is easy to 
state. Lost profits are simply “the difference between the money [the patentee] would have realized 
from such sales if the infringement had not interfered with such monopoly, and the money he did 
realize from such sales.”17 Such a sum puts the patentee in the pecuniary position she would have 
                                                 
13 Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co., (1880) 5 App. Cas. 25 (H.L.) 39; see also Restatement (First) of Torts 
§ 903 cmt. a (1939) (“Where there has been harm only to the pecuniary interests of a person, compensatory damages 
are designed to place him in a position substantially equivalent in a pecuniary way to that which he would occupy 
had no tort been committed.”). 
14 Yale Lock Mfg. v. Sargent, 117 U.S. 536, 552 (1886). 
15 Wicker v. Hoppock, 73 U.S. 94, 99 (1867). See Birdsall v. Coolidge, 93 U.S. 64, 64 (1876) (“Compensatory 
damages . . . shall be the result of the injury alleged and proved, and that the amount awarded shall be precisely 
commensurate with the injury suffered, neither more nor less, whether the injury be to the person or estate of the 
complaining party.”); 2 Simon Greenleaf, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence § 253 (16th ed. 1899) (“[Damages] 
should be precisely commensurate with the injury, neither more nor less”). 
16 See McSherry Mfg. Co. v. Dowagiac Mfg. Co., 163 F. 34, 35 (6th Cir. 1908); Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville 
Corp., 718 F.2d 1056, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1983); 3 William C. Robinson, The Law of Patents for Useful Inventions 
§ 1061 (1890). 
17 Yale Lock, 117 U.S. at 552–53; see also Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507 
(1964) (plurality opinion) (“[The] question [is] primarily, had the Infringer not infringed, what would [the] Patentee 
Holder–Licensee have made?”). 
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enjoyed in a world without patent infringement, thus achieving the fundamental purpose of 
compensatory damages: restoring the plaintiff to her rightful position.18 
Applying a geographic limit at the remedies stage can cause patent damages to deviate from 
this intended mark. To illustrate, consider a U.S. patent holder with a well-established business 
using her patented tool in Texas and Louisiana. Each year, the patent holder earns $2 million in 
profit by using this tool in Texas and another $1 million in profit by using this tool in Louisiana. 
A competitor begins making his own version of the patented tool and selling it to customers in 
Texas, directly infringing the patent under § 271(a). These customers in turn compete with the 
patent holder by using the tool to perform work in both Texas and Louisiana. As a result of this 
new competition, the patentee’s profits drop to zero for a year. Then infringement ceases, and the 
patentee’s profits return to their $3 million annual level. 
No one would dispute that the sum necessary to restore the patent holder to her rightful position 
is $3 million. Had the other manufacturer not infringed, the patentee would have earned $2 million 
in annual profits from work in Texas and $1 million in annual profits from work in Louisiana. 
Instead, she earned nothing. Compensatory damages call for restoring the plaintiff to her rightful 
position, so the plaintiff should be awarded the full $3 million. On these facts, the en banc Federal 
Circuit would seem to agree.19  
But if we change the facts slightly so that the patent holder is using her patented tool not in 
Texas and Louisiana but in Texas and France, her quest for full compensation will encounter the 
Federal Circuit’s geographic limit on patent damages. The $2 million loss of profits in Texas would 
remain cognizable, but the court would deny recovery of the $1 million loss of profits in France.20 
The patentee’s total recovery would now be capped at $2 million. 
This change in outcome is remarkable, because nothing about the infringing conduct has 
changed—the other manufacturer is still infringing under § 271(a), at the same volume, still in 
Texas, through the manufacture and sale of the patented tool. Moreover, the harm those domestic 
acts of infringement have done to the patentee is the same too—she is still $3 million worse off as 
a direct result of the infringement. But, because the patent holder’s business is now vulnerable in 
a different market—she is losing profits in Texas and France, not Texas and Louisiana—the 
Federal Circuit would stop short of restoring her rightful position. 
This departure from the rightful position principle is not the product of a peculiar example. 
Taken to its logical conclusion, damages subjected to a geographic screen will fail to restore the 
patentee to her rightful position in all cases in which some portion of her lost profits would have 
come from overseas.  
To be clear, failing to restore the plaintiff’s rightful position does not necessarily mean that 
damages are undercompensatory as a matter of policy. The rightful position itself is defined by the 
application of patent scope doctrines at the liability stage, and there is no reason to think that all 
of these lines have been drawn in exactly the right place. Claim scope could be too broad or too 
narrow; the territorial reach of the patent system could be too sweeping or too constrained; patent 
term might be too long or too short. There is a complex interplay among all of these, and rewarding 
invention efficiently requires balancing technical, geographic, and temporal scope to provide the 
                                                 
18 See Douglas Laycock, Modern American Remedies: Cases and Materials, 14–15 (4th ed. 2010). 
19 See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“[T]o refuse to award 
reasonably foreseeable damages necessary to make [the patentee] whole would be inconsistent with the meaning of 
§ 284.”). 
20 See WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 791 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 138 
S. Ct. 734 (Jan. 12, 2018) (No. 16-1011) (“[U]nder § 271(a) the export of a finished product cannot create liability 
for extraterritorial use of that product.”). 
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desired level of rewards while imposing the least amount of deadweight loss.21 Given all this, 
observing that a particular damages rule fails to restore the plaintiff to her rightful position is not 
to conclude anything about what the socially optimal level of damages ought to be. And, indeed, 
applying longstanding principles of actual and proximate causation will sometimes result in 
damages short of the rightful position as well.22  
The flaw with the Federal Circuit’s approach is not that the resulting damages will necessarily 
be undercompensatory. Rather, the problem is that the court has replaced a set of generally 
applicable, flexible tools for limiting damages with a newly crafted, bright-line prohibition that 
applies only to a particular scope boundary.  
 
 
II. A GEOGRAPHIC LIMIT ON DAMAGES IS INCONSISTENT WITH  
LONGSTANDING REMEDIAL PRACTICE 
 
There are at least two things that are peculiar about the Federal Circuit’s approach to damages 
across geographic borders. First, as noted above, the Federal Circuit itself relies on actual and 
proximate causation to police damages that cross the limits of a patent’s technical scope.23 Second, 
for a period of approximately 130 years—ended only by the Federal Circuit’s 2013 decision in 
Power Integrations24—courts consistently used these very same tools to assess damages that 
happened to cross a geographic boundary. In other words, the longstanding practice has been to 
treat the geographic limit of patent rights just like their technical limit.  
For example, in Ketchum Harvester Co. v. Johnson Harvester Co.,25 the infringer produced 
the patented machine in the United States, which it then sold both in the United States and abroad. 
Everyone agreed the act of selling outside the United States did not constitute infringement; the 
only question was what damages the patentee could receive for each unit that was manufactured 
domestically but sold abroad. The infringer argued that the patentee should be limited to nominal 
damages for these units, as any harm suffered by the patentee came from the foreign act of sale, 
rather than the domestic step of manufacture. Justice Blatchford rejected this geographic limit on 
evidence of harm, explaining: 
 
It is true that the sale is the fruition, and gives the profit, and that the sale is abroad, 
and the patent does not cover the sale abroad. But the unlawful act of making is made 
hurtful by a sale, wherever made . . . [T]o deprive the patentee of all damages for 
unlawful making here, because the article is sold abroad, is to deprive him of part of 
what his patent secures to him.26 
 
This holding is directly at odds with the Federal Circuit’s rule applying geography as an 
independent screen at the remedies stage. After all, if the defendant in Ketchum Harvester had 
been making the infringing machines simply for the sake of storing them in a warehouse (or, say, 
                                                 
21 See generally Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813 
(1984); Stephen Yelderman, International Cooperation and the Patent-Antitrust Intersection, 19 TEXAS INTELL. 
PROP. L.J. 193 (2011). 
22 See infra Part III. 
23 See Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1645. 
24 Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 711 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
25 8 F. 586 (C.C.N.D.N.Y 1881). 
26 Id. at 587.  
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to use them as firewood), the patentee would have been unable to prove any harm, and thus would 
have been eligible only for nominal damages.27 It was the defendant’s foreign sale that magnified 
the harm of the domestic infringement, and it was this same foreign sale that made the patentee 
eligible for something more than nominal damages. Once a domestic act of infringement is proven, 
“it is no injustice to attribute to the unlawful act all the consequences which flow from it”—even 
if those consequences unfold outside the United States.28  
So the question of how the rightful position principle interacts with the geographic scope of 
intellectual property is actually quite an old one. And until quite recently, the answer was clear: 
“The act of infringement having been committed in this country, the subsequent acts abroad are 
immaterial, except upon the question of damages.”29 Indeed, a number of pre-Federal Circuit 
patent cases, in both law and equity, expressly contemplate awards based on consequences that 
unfold overseas.30 And in 1939, the Second Circuit likewise held that copyright owners could look 
overseas to establish the measurement of their remedy.31  
But it is not just patent and copyright plaintiffs who have long been permitted to recover 
damages based on foreign consequences. In fact, cases from many disparate areas of law have 
consistently reached or implied the same conclusion. For example, by the early twentieth century 
it was well established in both courts of law and admiralty that a ship owner could recover damages 
for loss of use of a vessel that was improperly detained or otherwise delayed.32 If the law of 
damages recognized a geographic limit on cognizable harm like the Federal Circuit’s, the lost 
profits claims of these ship owners would have encountered it constantly. For example, if damages 
cannot account for foreign consequences, loss of use of a ship would frequently be limited to 
profits from domestic ports of call, and forsaken freight charges prorated to account for 
noncompensable mileage upon the high seas. But none of these cases even hint at such a limit.33 
Nor can this geographic limit be found in any number of tort or contract cases presenting facts 
                                                 
27 See id.; Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1123, 1125 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600). Note that, at the time 
of Ketchum Harvester, a patentee unable to prove actual harm would have received only nominal damages. 
However, the Supreme Court later approved use of a reasonable royalty as a fallback method in cases in which other 
measures of harm defied proof. See Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 648–50 
(1915). This reasonable royalty floor is now required by statute. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 284 (stating that the court shall 
award damages “in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer”). For 
an argument that the need to prove harm in order to recover supra-nominal damages survived Dowagiac, see Oskar 
Liivak, When Nominal Is Reasonable: Damages for the Unpracticed Patent, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1031 (2015). 
28 See Ketchum Harvester, 8 F. at 587. 
29 Fishel v. Lueckel, 53 F. 499, 501 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1892) (emphasis added). 
30 See Ketchum Harvester, 8 F. at 586–87 (awarding non-nominal damages as a result of foreign sales); Goulds’ 
Mfg. Co. v. Cowing, 105 U.S. 253, 254–56 (1881) (accounting for profits of infringing pumps manufactured in U.S. 
but sold in Canada); K. W. Ignition Co. v. Temco Elec. Motor Co., 283 F. 873, 874, 879–80 (6th Cir. 1922) 
(accounting for profits of foreign sales (citing Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641 
(1915))). 
31 See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45, 52–54 (2d Cir. 1939) (citing Goulds’ and 
Dowagiac to permit recovery of profits made through foreign use of a domestically manufactured copy), aff’d, 309 
U.S. 390 (1940). 
32 See 1 Theodore Sedgwick, Arthur George Sedgwick & Joseph Henry Beale, Treatise on the Measure of 
Damages § 196 (9th ed. 1912). 
33 See, e.g., Williamson v. Barrett, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 101, 111–12 (1851); Sturgis v. Clough, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 
269, 271–72 (1863); The Margaret J. Sanford, 37 F. 148, 149–52 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1888) (evaluating evidence of 
profits that a ship would have earned if damage suffered in New York had not delayed her return to Bombay); The 
Gazelle (1844) 2 W. Rob. 279, 166 Eng. Rep. 759 (High Ct. of Adm.) (“In estimating the amount of the 
compensation to be paid for the detention of the vessel . . . the suffering party [should be put] as nearly as possible in 
the same situation in which he would have been if no collision had taken place.”). 
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where such a limit might have come into play—such as a suit for breach of contract to share the 
proceeds of a whaling expedition,34 for lost income of a travelling actor who was waylaid by an 
assault,35 for damages against a Texas property owner whose incursions into Rio Grande caused 
destruction in Mexico,36 or for loss of use of a defective international airliner.37  
To be clear, some of these cases involved claims with different geographic scope on the 
question of liability. But once liability was established, none of these cases applied a geographic 
screen a second time on the question of damages. The Federal Circuit’s double application of the 
geographic scope limitation appears to have been quite unprecedented. 
 
III.  THE ALTERNATIVE: CABINING DAMAGES BASED ON ACTUAL AND PROXIMATE CAUSATION 
 
If the geographic scope limitation applies only to the question of liability, what (if anything) 
should serve as the limiting principle on the question of damages? The alternative to double 
reliance on the geographic scope of patents is to turn to generally applicable principles of actual 
and proximate causation. This is how the Federal Circuit has long assessed damages for harms 
across technical scope. The same tools are capable of constraining damages for harms across 
geographic scope as well. 
 
A. Actual Causation (Causation-in-fact) 
 
It is a well-established principle of tort law that a plaintiff must prove that her claimed injury 
was actually caused by the wrongful act.38 When it comes to claims of lost profits, proof of actual 
causation is a persistent challenge, since there is no way of knowing for certain what might have 
been in the counterfactual universe in which the defendant did not commit the tort.39 Despite this 
evidentiary difficulty, a patent holder nonetheless cannot obtain lost profits without proof of actual 
causation. As the Eighth Circuit has explained, “There is no presumption that [the patentee] would 
have sold its devices to those who purchased the infringing articles.”40 
Even in a case of purely domestic competition, the existence of multiple suppliers and non-
infringing substitutes can make it quite difficult to prove lost profits.41 For example, when there 
                                                 
34 See Dennis v. Maxfield, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 138 (1865). 
35 See Welch v. Ware, 32 Mich. 77 (1875). 
36 See Armendiaz v. Stillman, 54 Tex. 623, 627–28 (1881). 
37 See Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschaapij, N. V. v. United Technologies Corp., 610 F.2d 1052, 1053–56 (2d 
Cir. 1979). 
38 See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254–55, 261–64 (1978) (“The cardinal principle of damages in Anglo-
American law is that of compensation for the injury caused to plaintiff by defendant’s breach of duty.” (internal 
citation and quotation marks omitted)); SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE VOL. 2 § 254 
(16th ed. 1899) (“All damages must be the result of the injury complained of; whether it consists in the withholding 
of a legal right, or the breach of a duty legally due to the plaintiff.” (emphasis in original)). 
39 See 1 Sedgwick et al., supra note 32, § 173 (“Where an injured party claims compensation for gain prevented, 
the amount of loss is always to some extent conjectural; for there is no way of proving that what might been, what 
would have been.”). 
40 Oil Well Improvements Co. v. Acme Foundry & Mach. Co., 31 F.2d 898, 901 (8th Cir. 1929); see also Seymour 
v. McCormick, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 480, 490 (1854).  
41 See Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“To prevent the 
hypothetical from lapsing into pure speculation, this court requires sound economic proof of the nature of the market 
and likely outcomes with infringement factored out of the economic picture.”); Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Eve-USA, 
Inc., 851 F.3d 1275, 1284–86 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (collecting recent Federal Circuit cases and academic commentary to 
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are a number of competing products on the market, both infringing and non-infringing, it may be 
“impossible to say how many, if any, of the sales made by [the infringer] were sales lost by [the 
patentee].”42 Even when the patentee and the infringer were the only manufacturers of the patented 
product at the time, the patentee may still need to bring customer-by-customer evidence to show 
that her own offering would have been preferable to the non-infringing substitutes on the market.43 
When proof of sales diversion is tough to come by, the patentee may be left to recover lost profits 
based on only a tiny portion of the infringer’s actual sales.44  
Tall as this order may be in an ordinary case, a patentee seeking the profits from sales lost 
abroad will face an even steeper climb. An obvious question—likely to arise almost any time a 
patentee attempts such a feat—is why couldn’t the defendant have just manufactured and sold the 
accused product abroad and thus exploited the invention without ever encountering the U.S. patent 
system?45 In some cases, this question may sound the death knell for a patentee’s quest for foreign 
lost profits. But in other cases, a patentee might have satisfactory answers. For example, other 
intellectual property rights, customer relationships, and domestic manufacturing advantages may 
prevent complete expatriation from being a realistic alternative for the accused infringer.46 Given 
all this, proving foreign lost profits may never be easy. But when the U.S. patent holder can make 
that case—when she can show that the foreign lost profits really were the result of the domestic 
infringement—there is no reason to ignore this evidence of actual causation. 
 
B. Proximate Causation 
 
In addition to causation-in-fact, the patentee must show that the defendant’s infringing acts 
were the proximate cause of the claimed lost profits. As the Supreme Court recently explained, 
“For centuries, it has been a well-established principle of the common law, that in all cases of loss, 
we are to attribute it to the proximate cause, and not to any remote cause.”47 At heart, this is a 
“judicial tool[] used to limit a person’s responsibility for the consequences of [his] own acts,”48 
rooted in the recognition that it would be impossible to trace the consequences of events ad 
infinitum.49 
                                                 
show difficulty of proving but-for causation), petition for cert. filed, 86 U.S.L.W. 3299 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2017) (No. 
17-804). 
42 McSherry Mfg. Co. v. Dowagiac Mfg. Co., 163 F. 34, 35 (6th Cir. 1908).  
43 See Power Specialty Co. v. Conn. Light & Power Co., 80 F.2d 874, 875–77 (2d Cir. 1936). 
44 See Oil Well Improvements, 31 F.2d. at 901. 
45 Cf. Grain Processing, 185 F.3d at 1350–51 (“[A] fair and accurate reconstruction of the ‘but for’ market also 
must take into account, where relevant, alternative actions the infringer foreseeably would have undertaken had he 
not infringed.”). 
46 See Dorsey Revolving Harvester Rake Co. v. Bradley Mfg. Co., 7 F. Cas. 946, 947 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1874) (No. 
4,015) (“A patentee may find it greatly to his advantage, and greatly profitable, to supply a foreign demand for an 
article of American manufacture, and may be able successfully to compete with foreign machinists in the making . . . 
[H]is actual monopoly does include all making and selling here, with all the advantages which are incident 
thereto.”). 
47 Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1390 (2014) (internal quotation marks 
and modifications omitted); see also Southern Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531, 533–34 
(1918) (“The general tendency of the law, in regard to damages at least [is not to] . . . attribute remote consequences 
to a defendant so it holds him liable if proximately the plaintiff has suffered a loss.”). 
48 Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992). 
49 See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 532 n.24 (1983). 
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Proximate cause limitations have been an established feature of patent remedies for well over 
a century.50 Though the earliest cases are vague about the limits of proximate cause in patent law, 
the 1937 edition of Deller’s Walker on Patents recites the following theories of harm as being too 
remote to serve as the basis for compensatory damages: 
 
* The infringement “so unexpectedly reduced the business in the patented article as 
to make it necessary for [the patentee] to sell unpatented property at less than its 
real value, or to borrow money at more than a proper rate of interest”; 
* The infringement “encouraged other persons to infringe, from whom, by reason 
of insolvency or other obstacle, no recovery can be obtained”; 
* The infringement “caused the patentee so much trouble and anxiety that he 
incurred loss from inability to attend to other business”; 
* The infringement “caused [the patentee] to suffer competition and loss, in business 
outside the patent infringed.”51 
The first three of these examples have clear antecedents in the general law of damages and 
seem to have required little explication in the context of patent law. For example, the first is a 
straightforward application of the well-known rule that a plaintiff may not recover damages on the 
grounds that the defendant’s actions forced him to sell goods at a loss or resulted in a loss of 
credit.52 The fourth, however—that the infringement “caused [the patentee] to suffer competition 
and loss in business outside the patent infringed”—is by its terms specific to patent law, and so 
calls for some patent-specific line drawing. 
An early circuit court case illustrates how this particular limit on proximate cause has long 
operated in patent law. In Piper v. Brown,53 the patentee sought an accounting of profits from an 
infringer of his patented fish preservation process. In addition to the profits the infringer earned in 
the market for preserved salmon, the patentee sought to obtain the profits the infringer earned in 
the market for fresh (or “green”) salmon. The theory, in short, was that the two output markets 
were tied by a common input market—that by using the patented preservation method, the 
infringer was able to take more wild salmon out of circulation and thus was able to raise prices in 
the market for green salmon as well.54 The court held that these profits depended “upon future 
bargains or speculations, or future states of the market” and therefore were too “remote and 
contingent” to be recoverable.55  
Although additional development may be necessary as future litigants present novel theories, 
the proximate cause requirement stands ready to prevent patentees from obtaining foreign lost 
profits that are too far removed from the domestic acts of infringement. For example, suppose a 
patentee tried to claim that the defendant’s domestic infringement had impacted the global supply 
of components, and thus had reduced the profitability of the patentee’s sales in foreign markets. 
                                                 
50 See Carter v. Baker, 5 F. Cas. 195, 202 (C.C.D. Cal. 1871) (No. 2,472); Buerk v. Imhaeuser, 4 F. Cas. 594, 595 
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1876) (No. 2,107) (“The damages in such a case must be confined to the direct and immediate 
consequences of the infringement, and not embrace those which are both remote and conjectural.”). 
51 3 ANTHONY WILLIAM DELLER, WALKER ON PATENTS § 832 (1937). 
52 See 1 Sedgwick et al., supra note 32 §§ 126c & 127 
53 19 F. Cas. 722 (C.C.D. Mass. 1873) (No. 11,181).  
54 Id. at 723. 
55 Id. 
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Even if the patentee could show actual causation on the facts, this damages theory would be 
foreclosed under the principle of Piper v. Brown—a shared input market may not serve as the 
connection between patented and unpatented output markets. Likewise, a patentee could not 
invoke domestic infringement as the cause of lost foreign sales on the theory that the infringement 
had distracted management, deprived the firm of capital, or otherwise increased its operating 
costs.56  
Notably, several of the recent cases in which the Federal Circuit has curtailed damages by 
employing its geographic screen were cases in which the patent holder had likely failed to establish 
that the claimed losses were proximately caused by the defendant’s domestic acts of infringement. 
For example, in Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd.,57 the patentee sought to collect 
a reasonable royalty on chips the defendant had both made and sold abroad. Of course, chips made 
and sold abroad did not themselves infringe the patent, but the patentee claimed these foreign sales 
would not have been possible without the benefit of certain design, testing, and customer-
integration steps performed in the United States. The foreign sales, the theory went, were the direct 
result of these infringing pre-production activities.58 This theory was ripe for disposal on grounds 
of proximate cause. But instead of engaging that question and extending a rule about proximate 
cause, the Federal Circuit rested on its hard-and-fast geographic limit.59  
As another example, Power Integrations60 also involved a remote theory of damages, one 
which the traditional proximate cause requirement was again well-equipped to handle. There, the 
patentee argued that the defendant could not have made any foreign sales without the infringing 
domestic sales on the theory that most customers would insist on using the same chip in all their 
devices throughout the world.61 This claim could have been easily rejected on proximate cause 
grounds; Federal Circuit precedent already held that a customer preference for purchasing 
infringing and non-infringing products as a package was too remote a connection to obtain lost 
profits on the non-infringing products.62 But, again, the court eschewed a fact-specific proximate 
cause ruling for a bright-line geographic limit on damages. 
This is not simply a matter of words. The problem with replacing the longstanding requirement 
of proximate cause with a geographic screen is that a bright-line territorial rule is simultaneously 
under- and over-inclusive. To use Carnegie Mellon as an example, if the infringing testing and 
customer integration steps are too far removed to permit damages based on the non-infringing sales 
of the completed design, the same should be true whether or not a national border is in the way. 
Whether those eventual chip sales are non-infringing because they occur overseas or because the 
chips themselves do not embody the claimed invention, they should not be used in the ultimate 
damages calculation. Likewise, if the only connection between infringing sales and non-infringing 
sales is a customer preference to purchase in bulk (the causal theory at the heart of Power 
Integrations), that connection should also be rejected as too remote when the bundled sales occur 
entirely within the United States. A blinkered view of geography overlooks the real concern with 
damages in many of these cases and creates the possibility of providing too much compensation 
once the geographic obstacles go away. 
                                                 
56 See DELLER, supra note 51, at § 832. 
57 807 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  
58 Id. at 1309–11. 
59 See id. at 1306–07 
60 Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 711 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
61 See Brief for Plaintiff-Cross Appellant Power Integrations, Inc. at 44, Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild 
Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 711 F.3d 1348 (C.A. Fed. 2013) No. 2011-1218, 2011 WL 2827447, at *44. 
62 See American Seating Co. v. USSC Grp., Inc., 514 F.3d 1262, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 11 
Moreover, asking the wrong question can lead to the wrong answer in the other direction as 
well. For example, in WesternGeco v. ION Geophysical, the patent holder made an extremely 
strong showing of proximate causation: the defendant infringed by supplying components of the 
patented invention to the patentee’s direct competitors, who in turn used those very components 
to take business from the patentee.63 Under almost any understanding of proximate cause, these 
losses would be considered sufficiently direct to be recoverable. But, because the Federal Circuit 
used geography as the limiting principle instead of proximate cause, the court denied recovery.64  
Admittedly, deciding cases on grounds of proximate cause will sometimes require a more 
nuanced inquiry, at least compared to applying a hard-and-fast geographic screen. But doing so is 
more faithful to the goal of providing damages “adequate to compensate for the infringement,”65 
and allows a court to implement that goal in a manner consistent with established remedial practice. 
CONCLUSION 
The technical and geographic limitations on patent scope are often at the center of a dispute 
over patent liability. But after infringement is found, those doctrines have done their work, and a 
different set of tools, long developed at common law, take the stage for purposes of assessing 
remedy. 
Once the hard-and-fast geographic limit on patent damages is out of the way, a certain doctrinal 
harmony can emerge through neutral application of the proximate cause limit across different kinds 
of scope boundaries. Courts assessing out-of-scope injuries in the future should be conscious of 
developing a unified jurisprudence of proximate cause, one that can transcend the particular kind 
of scope boundary at issue in a given case.  
                                                 
63 See WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 791 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 138 
S. Ct. 734 (Jan. 12, 2018) (No. 16-1011).  
64 Id. at 1351. 
65 35 U.S.C.A. § 284 (2012 & Supp. 2017). 
